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Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina had the world’s tenth largest 
trading economy.1 By 2005, the country had fallen to 33rd.2 The cyclical nature of global 
finances had had its effect on a nation dependent of primary commodity exports.  
In the years following the Great Depression, the agricultural sector, which 
employed a steadily decreasing percent of the workforce and produced a majority of the 
country’s exports, brought enough foreign currency into the country to cause an 
appreciation in the real exchange rate. This led to an economic situation commonly called 
“The Dutch Disease.”  
Different leaders had various responses to inflation and to the dominance of the 
agricultural industry in Argentina. Gen. Juan Perón’s attempt to establish successful 
manufacturing industries backfired as he subsidized sectors in which Argentina did not 
have a comparative advantage and therefore could not compete internationally without 
government support. The subsidies, continued by various governments to gain support 
from working class unions, discouraged the movement of labor into industries associated 
with the commodities boom, further exacerbating the effects of Dutch Disease. 
In the following pages, I will trace the ups and downs of the Argentine economy 
from its colonization by the Spanish to the present day, though I believe the key period 
that has determined the course of Argentina’s economy for the second half of the 
twentieth century and the early part of the twenty-first was the first presidency of Perón, 
from 1946 to 1955. I will elaborate on the division of labor in Argentina and its role in 
the economy. Ultimately, I hope to prove that the cause of Argentina’s economic 
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misfortunes was a Dutch Disease induced by the strong performance of the export-based 
agricultural sector and inflamed by the poor decisions made by multiple governments. 
 
A Brief History: Colonization through World War II 
 
 From its initial colonization to World War II, Argentina’s development was 
export driven. Economic improvement centered on the products of the pampas, the 
majority of which were bought by Europe. As in many countries in Latin America, “tax 
revenues came primarily from the foreign trade sector, and government expenditures 
were oriented toward the development of physical infrastructure.”3 However, the decline 
in international trade during the Great Depression and the two world wars convinced 
many Argentines that lasting economic growth could only be achieved if the country 
moved away from its dependence on the global import-export market.4 
Initial colonization of Argentina was centered on Buenos Aires and the northwest 
corner of the country, around Tucumán. The principal achievements of the failed first 
efforts to colonize Buenos Aires between 1536 and 1541 were the abandonment of cattle 
and horses on the pampas.5 Both species flourished and soon the beginnings of the 
gaucho culture were seen as natives domesticated the horses to hunt the cattle. Although 
the second Spanish attempt at Buenos Aires in 1580 succeeded, for much of the colonial 
period, the demographic and economic center of the country remained the northwest, 
close to the silver mines at Potosí, the second largest city in the Viceroyalty of Peru and 
the destination of mules, tallow, and leather from the estancias in the pampas.  
The mercantilist policies of imperial Spain mandated that all trade with Europe 
pass through the designated ports of Lima and Callao. Buenos Aires, because of its 
location, served as a convenient center for smuggling, especially with Britain and France. 
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The Bourbon Reforms of mid-1700s reorganized the economic and political systems of 
South America. In an effort to strengthen royal control, and to reap some benefit from the 
contraband trade passing through the port, Buenos Aires was established as the capital of 
the new Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata.6 It was now legally allowed to trade directly 
with Spain. Although the northwest was still the most productive part of the country, 
Buenos Aires was in ascendance.7 
 The French Revolution and the subsequent wars on the European continent 
sparked the wars of independence in Spain’s colonies in the New World. The Bourbon 
king of Spain was deposed in 1806 by invading French forces, and Joseph Bonaparte, the 
brother of Napoleon, was placed on the thrown. 
Seeing an opportunity at imperial expansion at the expense of the new Spanish 
enemy, a British force returning home from the successful conquest of Cape Town 
detoured to attack Buenos Aires. The British invasions of 1806 and 1807 put the country 
on the path to independence. The invaders briefly occupied the city, causing the panicked 
Viceroy to flee into the pampas. Independent of Spanish government support, the local 
inhabitants, under the leadership of the French-born Santiago de Liniers, defeated both 
the initial invaders and the much larger reinforcement expedition a year later. These two 
victories were instrumental in giving the Argentines enough self-confidence to declare 
independence from Spain.8  
 Meanwhile, across Spain’s possessions in the New World, various factions either 
declared their allegiance to the deposed Bourbon king, the new Bonaparte monarch, or 
declared their independence. In 1810, at the Congreso de Tucumán, the Viceroyalty of 
the Rio de la Plata separated from Spain. Initially, the city of Buenos Aires sought to 
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maintain the integrity of the Viceroyalty, but failed to prevent the separation of Paraguay 
and Uruguay. Even many of the provinces threatened to leave the union which Buenos 
Aires sought to control. This conflict between Buenos Aires and the interior would 
continue until the mid-1800s.  
 Spanish power in South America ended in 1824. Although Argentina was 
independent, it required several strong rulers through the mid 1800s to solidify the 
identity of the country. Through 1862, the country was divided between two factions. On 
one side was Buenos Aires, which wanted all trade to pass though its harbor. On the other 
were the provinces, which resented Buenos Aires’ monopoly on foreign trade and wanted 
unrestricted access to overseas markets. At the height of the conflict, Buenos Aires 
separated from the rest of the country.9 From 1852 until Buenos Aires rejoined the 
republic in 1862, Argentina was two separate countries.  
 With the reentry of Buenos Aires, the main source of revenue for the country, 
Argentina entered a new era of growth. As settlement of the pampas expanded, wool and 
cereal production replaced the old colonial commodities of hides and tallow as the 
nation’s principal exports.10 Good economic conditions and labor shortages led to an 
influx of immigrant Europeans, especially from Italy and Spain. The population grew 
from two million in 1869 to eight million in 1914, and in 1914, the census showed that 
seventy percent of the working class of Buenos Aires was foreign born.11 Some of these 
new arrivals moved out to the frontier. However, increased settlement of the pampas 
invited increased raids from Indians in Patagonia.  Both to protect its borders and to allay 
the fears of would be immigrants, in 1878, General and later President Roca initiated his 
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“Conquest of the Desert,” a conquest/extermination that effectively eliminated Indian 
resistance in the country.12 
 Improved technology, especially the invention of refrigerated shipping in the 
1870s, made Argentina a leading exporter of beef, although other commodities like corn 
and wheat continued to be exported on a large scale. The late 19th and early 20th centuries 
were the belle époque of Argentina, with the economy growing at an annual rate of 3.7 
percent.13  As can be evidenced in the table below, the GDP per capita rose substantially 
between 1850 and 1913. Although its GDP per capita was only about half that of the 
U.S., it compared favorably with Canada, and Argentine citizens were economically 
better off than their neighbors in Chile and Brazil. 
            Historical per Capita Growth of GDP (per capita in 1985 U.S. $)14 
 1850 1913 
Argentina 874 2,377 
Chile 484 1,685 
Brazil 901 700 
Canada 850 3,560 
United States 1,394 4,854 
 
The restrictions on foreign trade during the First World War and its immediate 
aftermath slowed the economy to an annual growth rate of -0.1 percent, although there 
was a “sharp upswing” in the middle of the period.15 The economy recovered, and by the 
twenties, “Argentina continued with export-led growth based on extensive agriculture 
that in part involved bringing new land into production.”16 In 1929, on the eve of the 
Great Depression, merchandise exports composed more than twenty-five percent of the 
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GDP.17 In comparison, in 1929, merchandise exports composed fifteen percent of the 
GDPs of the U.K. and Germany and slightly less in France.18 Only about ten percent of 
Argentine exports went to the U.S.19 The biggest buyers were in Europe, especially the 
U.K., which purchased 32.3 percent of Argentina’s exports, while France and Germany 
combined purchased 17 percent.20  
With such a heavy reliance on exports, the drop in the prices of primary 
commodities during the Great Depression, combined with the protectionist policies of 
Argentina’s principal customers, shocked the economy.21 The economic isolationism of 
the great consumers, exemplified by the American Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, 
worsened the global situation and convinced many Argentines that heavy involvement 
with the world economy would only result in economic ruin.22  
The Argentine government responded to the situation with a moderate increase in 
tariffs and imposed foreign exchange restrictions “in response to balance of payments 
problems.”23 Although at this point the Argentine government was still attempting to 
maintain a balanced budget, its monetary policy was more active than many other Latin 
American countries.24 The real money supply increased from 99.6 in 1928 to 109.8 in 
1934 to 108.3 in 1939.25 At the same time, the real exchange rate depreciated, from 1.00 
in 1929, to 1.50 in 1934, to 1.43 in 1939.26 As a result, “the prices of importables and 
nontradeables increased relative to those of exportables.”27 This increase was the result of 
government policy, and served to protect an expanding industrial sector. As a 
consequence, the Argentine GDP grew at an average rate of 2.5 percent during the period 
of 1931-1940.28 
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 The outbreak of World War II added political concerns to the economic equation. 
As part of its war effort, the U.S. attempted to secure the support of the South American 
countries. Although Brazil sided with America, and even sent soldiers to fight in Italy, 
Argentina, ever suspicious of the expansion of Yankee influence in South America, 
rebuffed diplomatic overtures and instead signed arms deals with Nazi Germany. 
Although many citizens of the country were sympathetic to the Allies, the Argentine 
government’s failure to declare war on Germany until 1945 combined with the Army’s 
friendship and admiration for the German Army led many in the American government to 
believe that Argentina was pro-Nazi. The U.S. responded negatively, preventing 
countries from using Marshall Plan dollars to buy Argentine products.29 This would not 
be the last time Argentina’s politics would harm the economy. 
 
The Dutch Disease 
 That was the situation in Argentina in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War. What followed was Perón’s attempt to continue to improve the economic 
well-being of the country by formalizing the expansion of ISI (that had, in effect, begun 
during the de facto protection of the Great Depression and World War II) and thus 
removing Argentina from the cyclical nature of the global marketplace. However, 
Perón’s approach was incorrect because it failed to address the true problem: the Dutch 
Disease. 
 The Dutch Disease is a situation in which a booming export section employing a 
small percentage of the workforce hampers other parts of a nation’s overall economy. In 
a textbook case, “booming primary exports, by stimulating more rapid domestic inflation 
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and thus causing the real exchange rate to appreciate, render other exports less 
competitive and hence less profitable.”30 An influx of foreign currency from the chief 
export causes the value of the local currency to increase relative to other currencies. At 
the same time, higher incomes of those associated with the boom cause inflation as 
demand and prices increase for nontradable goods. This causes the real exchange rate to 
appreciate, making other tradable goods produced in the country less competitive in 
international and domestic markets. (A tradeable good is something a country produces 
that can be exported or imported while a nontradeable is a good produced domestically as 
is not imported or exported, like utilities and many services).31 While production of 
nontradables grows due to increased demand, the workers of less competitive tradable 
industries, who greatly outnumber the workers from the boom sector, are faced with 
rising prices and need higher incomes to survive. Their employers, however, cannot raise 
wages (which would necessitate raising prices) and be competitive. Reduced profits from 
the appreciating exchange rate will “cause some of them to reduce production and 
employment.”32 Thus, “the boom in primary exports and nontradables is partly offset by a 
depression in the other tradable industries.”33 
 The Dutch Disease got its name from the experiences of the Netherlands in the 
1960s and ‘70s after reserves of natural gas were discovered and the country received a 
large influx of foreign exchange.34 Other countries have had similar experiences. 
Nigeria’s is typical. Oil was discovered there in 1956, but the industry only employed a 
fraction of the population. In 1975, only 0.4 percent of the labor forced worked in the 
petroleum sector.35 The OPEC oil embargo in the early 1970s quadrupled the price of 
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petroleum, and it doubled again between 1979 and 1980.36 As a result, the Nigerian 
nonmining GDP rose twenty-three percent.37  
The government took advantage of this increase in funds, and “public investment 
rose from 4 to 30 percent of nonmining GDP and the average pay for civil servants was 
doubled in 1975.”38 However, with much of the new money wasted on useless projects, 
the Nigerian government ran an average budget deficit of twelve percent of the GDP 
from 1981 to 1984.39 Even with the increase in consumer spending, the central bank 
decided to maintain the nominal exchange rate, and, as a result, the real exchange rate 
tripled from 1971 to 1984.40 This caused the nonoil exports of Nigeria to drop ninety 
percent.41 Throughout all this, a politically weak agricultural sector was ignored while 
other sectors were developed.42 From 1973 to 1984, agricultural exports fell by two 
thirds.43 Due to the decrease in nonoil exports, Nigerian growth during the 1972-1981 
period was sixty percent of what it had been before the boom.44 
 Nigeria’s experience is different than Argentina’s in a key aspect: in Nigeria, as in 
many oil-producing countries, the agriculture sector was a victim of Dutch Disease; in 
Argentina, the cause of Dutch Disease was the high volume of foreign currency brought 
in by the booming, export-oriented agriculture sector.  
 There are ways to beat the Dutch Disease. Pursing anti-inflationary policies, such 
as devaluing the currency, cutting back on government spending, or devaluing the 
exchange rate, can help mitigate the need for less competitive exporting industries to cut 
production, and “if it is relatively easy to move capital and labor between the booming 
commodity sector and other activities and if the booming sector can employ all the 
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factors of production released from other, less-profitable activities, then the commodity 
boom poses no major problem.”45  
During much of the twentieth century, the governments of Argentina did not 
pursue anti-inflationary policies (they pursued inflationary ones), and during the second 
half of the twentieth century, the agricultural industry, the boom sector, went from 
employing 26 percent of the workforce in 1950 to just 13 percent in 1980.46 As will be 
elaborated upon later, workers in the agricultural sector lived in the rural, less developed 
areas of the country. The unattractiveness of sub-par living conditions, mechanization, 
and Peronist industrial subsidies served to prevent the movement of workers from city 
jobs to agriculture. City jobs were in protected industries, and the workers there were 
being paid more than they had in the past.47 The increased spending from this industrial 
class served to increase inflation, the opposite of what was required to cure Dutch 
Disease. 
 
The Rise of Perónism 
Riding a wave of popular support, Juan Domingo Perón was elected president in 
1946 and, in part to appease his power base in the unions, instituted a formal policy of 
ISI.48 Import substitution industrialization was the government policy of instituting high 
tariffs and quota systems to protect state-owned industries from foreign competition 
while also granting those industries tax and credit incentives.49 The belief was that after 
these state-owned businesses had reached a certain level of productivity they would no 
longer need tariffs and subsidies in order to compete with foreign industry.50 However, 
taking advantage of the rising prices of agricultural commodities in the aftermath of 
World War II, the government funded ISI by taxing agricultural exports,  
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“which neutralized any beneficial effect that the new terms of trade 
might have had on domestic agricultural prices. In addition, high tariffs 
and restrictions on imports were imposed to protect domestic producers 
from foreign competition. The net result was that agriculture stagnated 
while the import substitution industry grew rapidly. The scene was set 
for the ‘stop-go’ performance that…characterized Argentina’s 
economy for the next four decades.”51 
 The economic conditions of the 1930s contributed to the beginning of the internal 
migration of many people from the countryside and smaller provincial towns to the cities, 
especially Buenos Aires, where there were greater opportunities for work.52 During the 
Perónist Era and beyond, the percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture 
dropped from twenty-six percent in 1950 to thirteen percent in 1980.53  
It was not only the prospect of work that drove people from jobs in the agriculture 
sector. The quality of life in rural areas was significantly less than in urban centers. Even 
by the year 2000, only thirty percent of the population living in rural areas had access to 
improved drinking water sources, and only forty-eight percent had access to improved 
sanitation facilities.54 In comparison, in 2000, eighty-five percent of the urban population 
had access to improved drinking water sources and eighty-nine percent had access to 
improved sanitation facilities.55  
Intensification of existing farmland also served to decrease the number of people 
employed in agriculture. An excess of land and a lack of labor had always been the lot of 
the Argentine agriculturalist, and this led to induced innovation. Farmers were forced, by 
lack of labor, to mechanize their operations as soon as was technologically possible. 
However, during the second half of the twentieth century: 
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“to compensate in part for the reduced relative prices of agricultural 
outputs, the government subsidized some of the inputs used in 
agricultural production. Specifically, it made credit available at 
subsidized rates of interest, offered tax exemptions for the purchase of 
farm machinery, and provided financial support for technological 
research.”56 
As a result, from 1979, the first year for which data is available, to 2001, the 
number of tractors per sq. km of arable land rose from 0.6 to 0.9.57 More significantly, 
the amount of fertilizer consumption rose from 46 hundred grams of nutrient per hectare 
in 1979 to 330 hundred grams of nutrient per hectare in 1998.58 
Regardless of the migration of labor, and “although agriculture had been 
overshadowed significantly by industry since the end of World War II, [the agriculture 
sector] nonetheless contributed substantially to Argentina’s GDP.”59 From 1961-1985, 
agricultural exports composed more than fifty percent of Argentina’s exports.60 Between 
1981 and 1985, the agriculture sector made up 11.2 percent of the national GDP while 
employing 13 percent of the labor force.61 Despite Perón’s emphasis on industry, the 
agriculture industry still supplied the majority of the country’s exports.  
In 1945, during Perón’s stint as Labor Minister, the Law of Professional 
Associations was passed. This law established an umbrella union, the Confederación 
General de Trabajo (CGT), which would be the voice of all unions to the government.62 
With government support, unions expanded rapidly. In 1943, only about twenty percent 
of the urban labor force was unionized.63 Union membership increased from 520,000 
members in 1946 to 2,334,000 in 1951.64 Perón recognized the potential power of the 
 14
unions and supported laws that led to their expansion, and they in turn supported his rise 
to the top.65 
These previously unaffiliated new arrivals from the rural areas were ready recruits 
for Perónist labor unions.66 While some found employment in the expanding industrial 
sector (which increased in size from 435,816 workers in 1935 to 1,056,673 workers in 
1946), others became the newest residents of the ever increasing number of villas 
miseria, the slums in Greater Buenos Aires.67 The poor circumstances of many 
Argentines only increased union members support for Perón. Indeed, “almost anyone 
inquiring of a Perónist worker why he supported Perón [was] met by the significant 
gesture of tapping the back pocket where the money is kept, symbolizing a basic class 
pragmatism of monetary needs and their satisfaction.”68 
 Coinciding with the increased unionization was the release in 1950 of Raúl 
Prebisch’s The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems for 
the Economic Commission for Latin America (known by the acronym formed from its 
Spanish name, CEPAL). Prebisch’s theory explained the world economy as a relationship 
between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ countries.69 The condition of the economies of periphery 
countries depended on the condition of the core countries’ economies, and the 
relationship was typically explained with graphs showing cyclical performances, with the 
peaks and valleys of periphery countries more exaggerated than those of the core. 
Prebisch believed that periphery countries could free themselves from their cyclical ties 
to core countries by developing their own manufacturing sector to supply their own 
domestic market, removing the need to rely on the international market for economic 
well-being.70 
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 Prebisch’s ideas found a ready audience in an Argentine populace whose 
memories of the Great Depression were still fresh.71 As president of Argentina, Perón’s 
industrialization policies, articulated in his first five year plan, enacted enough trade 
barriers to effectively eliminate competition from imports.72 The barriers were effective. 
The value of imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP fell from twelve 
percent in 1938, to eleven percent in 1948, to six percent in 1958.73 Although Perón’s 
plans ensured support from the working class, they were not sound economic policy. By 
supporting domestic industry through tariff protection, Perón prevented the movement of 
labor between competitive and noncompetitive businesses. Workers lacked the incentive 
to move from one industry to another. Instead of saving government surpluses from taxes 
on agricultural exports, Perón spent excess funds on welfare projects and other programs 
to help laborers and the industries they worked for, whose effective monopolies on 
domestic markets provided customers with an often more expensive and inferior product. 
He did, however, buy political support.                                                                                                                
As long as primary commodity prices remained high, the Argentine government 
was able to use taxes on primary commodity exports to fund its programs. Indeed, the 
GDP per capita grew 2.3 percent from 1941-1949.74 However, a drought in the early 
fifties hurt agricultural production and decreased government revenues.75 After years of 
growth-inhibiting taxes, Perón attempted to revitalize the agricultural export section with 
his second 5 year plan in 1952. These new policies, which were implemented shortly 
after the death of Eva Perón, included “wage controls, partial price deregulation, 
encouraged foreign investment and the promotion of traditional [agricultural] exports,” 
and conflicted with his earlier policies.76 The new policies alienated his many of his 
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supporters, and ultimately, the military led a coup in 1955 that removed him from 
power.77  
Alternating military and civilian governments proved unwilling, for reasons of 
nationalism, radicalism, or personal benefit, to dismantle the large state-owned apparatus 
of industries.78 Instead of long term solutions, political and military governments 
throughout the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, concerned with maintaining power, tried to achieve, 
in the short-run, the objectives of price stability and deficit-reduction.79 Rather than lower 
export taxes and increase agricultural exports, successive governments saw export taxes 
on “the products of the pampas…to be an excellent way of dealing with those two 
problems in the short run.”80 Governments liked export taxes because they were quick 
and easy to collect, in marked contrast to the taxes brought in by the inefficient national 
tax collection system, which ran chronic deficits.81 
The rise of commodity prices in the aftermath of the first oil shock in the early 
1970s led to a windfall in revenue from export taxes on agriculture.82 This in turn led to a 
fifty percent increase in government expenditure from 1972 to 1975.83 However, the 
boom ended in 1975, and with the inefficient tax system unable to keep pace with 
demand, the government increased the money supply to cover budget deficits (a process 
called seignorage).84 It rose at an annual rate of growth of 154.2 percent in 1982 to 582.3 
percent in 1984 to 4,168.2 percent in 1989. Easy loans from international banks awash in 
oil money encouraged governments, both civilian and military, to increase public debt, 
both to cover the budget deficit and to pay interest on other loans. From 1976 to 1982, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio went from nineteen to sixty percent. 
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 A national debt of $42,000 million was inherited by Raul Alfonsín, the first 
democratically elected president after the military dictatorships of the ‘Dirty War.’85 
Concerned with healing civil society and preventing the return of the military, the 
administration of Alfonsín, “in an attempt to buy support from voters, organized labor, 
and business … ran a loose, populist monetary policy.”86 However, inflation, which rose 
from 164.8 percent in 1982 to 672.5 percent in 1985, necessitated a change.87 
In June of 1985, the Alfonsín government launched the Plan Austral.88 This plan 
was conceived as a “war on inflation.”89 A new currency, the austral, was introduced and 
wages and prices were frozen, and the government promised to limit the use of 
seignorage.90 The new plan, however, continued to favor industry over agriculture. The 
Alfonsín government continued to tax exports as a main source of revenue.91  
Initially, the Plan Austral worked. Inflation dropped from over 600 percent in 
1985 to 85.7 percent in 1986.92 The growth rate of the money supply also dropped, from 
584.3 percent in 1985 to 89.7 percent in 1986.93 However, investment failed to increase 
and the government did not ease price and wage controls as promised.94 An overvalued 
exchange rate hurt the balance of trade, and consumer confidence in the plan was 
undermined.95 Tax revenues fell, and urban unemployment rose from 3.9 percent in 1984 
to 7.6 percent in 1989.96 The government was force to increase borrowing, at higher 
interest rates, to cover budget deficits and maintain the exchange rate, and by 1989, the 
central bank had exhausted its reserves trying to defend the strength of the currency.97 
Seignorage was reintroduced, and the money supply rose from 89.7 percent in 1986 to 
4,168.2 percent in 1989.98 The austral went into free fall, with the inflation rate passing 
3,000 in 1989.99  
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Needless to say, Alfonsín did not win the 1989 presidential election. Victory went 
to a Perónist provincial governor named Carlos Saul Menem, who confounded 
expectations of a return to Perónist policies and instead ushered in a decade of growth. 
 
Structural Adjustment and Financial Meltdown 
Menem confounded expectations of a continuation of state ownership and instead 
privatized state companies. This caused rising unemployment as the new owners 
restructured businesses to make them more profitable.100 Coinciding with privatization 
was the implementation of the Convertibility Plan. This plan was the creation of 
Domingo Cavallo, the finance minister, and it pegged the peso to the dollar, bringing 
inflation under control by limiting the number of pesos the government could print.101 
There followed a decade of economic growth.102 
However, economic crises in other parts of the world and the rising domestic 
debt, which had ballooned under Menem, eventually put pressure on the Argentine 
government to abandon the Convertibility Plan, sending the country into the financial 
crisis of 2001 and 2002 that saw five presidents in ten days.103 
Menem’s privatization plans were in line with the policies of the Washington 
Consensus. These policies, which were championed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) encouraged “fiscal discipline, a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward 
fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income 
distribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure, tax 
reform, interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, 
liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation (to 
abolish barriers to entry and exit), and secure property rights.”104  
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 The hyperinflation of the eighties drove the Argentine government to abandon 
state ownership and accept the Washington Consensus.105 As part of his reformation of 
the Argentine economic system, Menem supported Cavallo’s Convertibility Plan. By 
effectively removing the government’s ability to print more money, Menem and Cavallo 
were removing a major source of inflation.106 Indeed, inflation fell from over three 
thousand percent in 1990 to less than one percent from 1996 to 1998.107 
 The one to one convertibility plan stabilized prices, which, in conjunction with the 
removal of price controls, the privatization of many previously state-owned companies, 
and the lowering of tariffs helped spark a boom of increased investment in the economy, 
both from within the country and without.108 Foreign firms like J.P. Morgan and Merrill 
Lynch bought millions of dollars worth of Argentine bonds.109 Domestic banks were also 
major customers, and bought government bonds with the savings of their depositors.  
Investment was focused in the primary sectors of the national infrastructure (like 
energy and telecommunications) as well as certain manufacturing industries such as 
automobiles and household appliances.110 With the exception of 1995, during the Tequila 
Crisis, the national GDP grew at a rate of around six percent for most of the nineties.111 
 Despite the growth of the economy, the government failed to adequately address 
two key problems: the funding of the pension system and spending by provincial 
governments. Due to the privatization of public industries, which transferred workers 
from public pension plans to private ones, and the “pay-as-you go nature of the state 
pension scheme,” “disbursements to existing pensioners could no longer be funded out of 
contributions by those who work,” and had to covered by the government, in part by 
selling bonds.112  
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The second problem was the excessive spending by the provincial governments. 
Over time, the conflict between the provinces and Buenos Aires produced a tax system in 
which “the federal government is largely responsible for raising taxes while the provinces 
function as spending machines.”113 Uncontrolled spending by the provinces increased the 
national deficit which the federal government was forced to cover by going deeper into 
debt.114 
The problems with the public finance system were compounded by the corruption 
of Menem and his successor, Fernando De la Rua. Some of the money borrowed by the 
Argentine government during this period was used by Menem to purchase political 
support through the financing of projects that benefited his supporters.115 De la Rua’s 
party, the UCR, was involved in a scandal involving the bribery of opposition senators 
for congressional votes.116  
Interest rates for government loans remained high throughout the Convertibility 
period, ensuring that borrowing continued to be expensive for the government.117 The 
high interest rates were caused in large part by the culture of political corruption. 
According to Colin Lewis, a Senior Lecturer at the London School of Economics and 
author of Argentina: A Short History, corruption in the political class “raised the cost of 
doing business in Argentina and undermined confidence in the political sustainability of 
the [Convertibility Plan].”118  
 Problems came to a head with the economic crisis in Brazil in 1999, when Brazil 
was forced to devalue its currency. Brazil was one the largest purchasers of Argentine 
exports, buying nearly a third of all products shipped overseas in 1998.119 With the 
devaluation, Brazilian domestic products became cheaper for Brazilians than Argentine 
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imports, “resulting in a 28 percent drop in Argentine exports to Brazil in 1999.”120 While 
exports to Brazil decreased, the international prices of agricultural commodities also 
dropped, further straining the economy.121  
 With a poor financial system and decreased export opportunities, the Argentine 
government had trouble covering its budget deficit and debt payments. At first the IMF 
delivered several loan packages, worth billions of dollars, to the country, but, in 
December of 2001, because the Argentine government couldn’t balance the budget, the 
IMF decided against granting another loan.122 Without the IMF bailout, in order to meet 
its financial obligations, the Argentine government was forced to abandon the 
Convertibility Plan and devalue its currency. However, even then the government was 
unable to make payments to its creditors, and was forced to default on its debt. At the 
same time, in order to prevent a run on the banks, which had purchased large amounts of 
now worthless government bonds, the government froze bank accounts, a move called el 
corralito.123 The people went to the streets in a rage, and the ensuing political mayhem 
saw a quick succession of presidents. 
 The situation began to settle with the election of Nestor Kirchner in May of 2003. 
In February 2005, after a series of negotiations, a majority of creditors accepted 
Kirchner’s offer of 35 cents for each dollar of debt. The creditors’ rationale for accepting 
the deal was that 35 cents to the dollar was better than possibly no money at all.124 Such 
was the state of the nation that was once the world’s tenth largest economy at the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
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Analysis 
 
Argentina emerged from its belle époque of the late 19th and early 20th century 
with an export-based economy and the belief that it was the next United States. The 
global economic situation of the Great Depression gave doubt to these aspirations and 
opened the door for Perónism. This movement sought to restore Argentina’s greatness by 
withdrawing from the cyclical world economy. Perón’s plans for ISI found favor with the 
labor unions, a group that he created into a Perónist powerbase. By turning the country’s 
back on the source of previous commercial success, Perón increased his own political 
power by increasing the role of the labor unions in Argentine society.  
 His plans for ISI were short-sighted. Argentina did not have a comparative 
advantage in industrial goods, except when it came to exporting to the limited regional 
markets of South America, a market with increasing competition from Brazil. 
Argentina’s comparative advantage lay in the exportation of agricultural goods. This 
sector, employing a fraction of the population, provided over fifty percent of its exports 
from 1961-1985.125 Although agricultural goods were subject to steep changes in prices, 
the pampas was fertile enough to allow Argentine farmers to switch among potentially 
profitable crops while the size of the nation allowed significant extensification.126 
 The sale of beef and wheat brought in large amounts of foreign currency. This 
caused the real exchange rate to appreciate. At the same time, the expansion of the 
industrial sector, due to ISI-protection, led to greater levels of employment and higher 
levels of income, especially in the nontradable sector. Consumer spending rose from 
industrial workers in this sector and from agricultural laborers. As a result, inflation 
increased. 
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Due to government protection of traditionally uncompetitive industries, like car 
manufacturing, workers in these industries had no economic motivation for changing 
jobs, and the power of the unions in the Perón presidency and subsequent 
administrations/regimes meant the government had every incentive to protect industrial 
workers’ jobs or risk loss of power.  
As the world economy recovered from World War II, the prices for many 
agricultural products decreased. Deprived of its largest source of revenue, and having 
already spent all the taxes collected from agricultural exports during the boom time, and 
with its industry internationally uncompetitive, successive Argentine governments were 
forced to borrow ever increasing amounts of money to cover their debts. The rising 
national debt exposed the country to the very outside economic influences which ISI had 
been designed to mitigate. Ultimately, it was this rising debt, sparked by the conditions of 
the Dutch Disease and enlarged by government mismanagement, that caused the collapse 
in 2001. 
The repeated macroeconomic mismanagement by the government has led to a loss 
of trust not only between foreign investors and the Argentine state but also between the 
Argentine government and its people. Without trust, future governmental policies 
designed to improve the economy will be met with cynicism. The immediate goal of 
Kirchner and future Argentine presidents will be to restore this trust by minimizing 
corruption, keeping inflation down, and creating growth with sound, non-populist 
economic policies. 
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